Background:
There are several possible reasons for finding an association obstacle and asking an association question. The simplest one may be an unknown word meaning preventing the reader from building a textbase. But obstacles to the representation of entities may also exist when meanings are known, but there are difficulties in accessing referents. For example, readers may know the meaning of "mast" but they may be unable to identify a referent to this term in a particular description of a sailing vessel:
What mast is it? In addition, representing entities is not an all-or-nothing matter, since it can be achieved to varying degrees. An obstacle can be found when objects and processes are identified but not enough features of the objects or processes are known.
For instance, a reader of the text mentioned above on sailing may find an obstacle to appropriately representing features of the specific sail mentioned, and may therefore ask What is the shape of a lugsail?
The second kind of obstacles is associated with the attempt to draw explanatory inferences and the impossibility to do so. Explanation questions concern justifications for or explanations about the entities included in a situation model, i.e., why objects and processes are the way they are. Causal relations are important to readers of both narrative (Keenan, Baillet, & Brown, 1984; Trabasso & Sperry, 1985) and expository texts (Coté, Goldman, & Saul, 1998) and constitute likely obstacles for readers. 
Hypotheses of the study
The basic hypothesis examined in this study is that, given a particular text and readers with certain knowledge, goals determine the obstacles encountered and the questions that may be asked to overcome such obstacles. We manipulated reading goals and the mental representation attempted by readers through two different tasks: reading a scientific text for understanding versus reading it to solve an algorithmic problem directly associated with it.
Although understanding and comprehension are admittedly fuzzy terms (Weaver, 1990) , they have sometimes been explicitly defined as building an adequate situation model of discourse (Graesser, Singer & Trabasso, 1994; Glenberg, Kruley, & Langston, 1994; Kintsch, 1998) . As pointed out, this involves generating inferences to achieve situation models of variable articulation and detail. In a situation of conscious understanding of scientific texts describing natural phenomena we anticipated a key role for explanatory inferences. This should be expected, in the first place, because conscious understanding, as regarded by constructionist theories, is explanation based . The importance of causal or goal-based explanations has been amply demonstrated by research on the understanding of narratives (Klin, 1995; Suh & Trabasso, 1993; Trabasso & Suh, 1993; Van den Broek, 1990) , but the less abundant research on expository texts also points toward the importance of explanatory inferences. Millis & Graesser (1994) , Singer & Gagnon (1999), and Wiley & Myers (2003) found evidence for causal antecedent inferences, a basic explanatory process, when undergraduate students read scientific texts. Coté, Goldman, & Saul (1998) found that the use of self-explanations was the dominant type of reasoning in think-aloud protocols of 4 th and 6 th grade students reading informational text. Lastly, indirect evidence of the importance of explanations in expository texts is provided by the finding of a positive relationship between logical relatedness and recall of statements in expository texts (Varnhagen, 1991) . Logical relations include the abstract explanatory relations that operate in expository texts, in addition to the physically or psychologically causative conditions considered in research on narratives.
Therefore, in correspondence with the importance of explanatory inferences in scientific text understanding, a high incidence of explanation obstacles would be expected in the case of students reading for understanding scientific texts that describe and explain natural phenomena. Direct support for the abundance of explanation obstacles may be found in a study by Costa, Caldeira, Gallástegui, and Otero (2000) .
Indeed, secondary school students where asked to read science passages similar to the ones used in our study. The students were instructed to ask questions that might help them understand the passages, and the questions were categorized according to the 18-item taxonomy of Graesser, Person, & Huber (1992) . The classification showed an overwhelming majority of questions in the "causal antecedent" category of the taxonomy.
Quite a different mental representation and different obstacles would be expected in a condition consisting in reading to solve an algorithmic problem. Based on the target passage, we built a simple problem that could be immediately solved by the application of a well-known problem schema. In a situation of routine problem-solving such as this, the problem schema guides not only the search process in the problem space, but also the process of understanding the problem statement: the expectations of the problem schema lead the solver to read the problem statement selectively (Van Lehn, 1989) , emphasizing the elements that may fill the schema's slots as suggested by the experiments conducted by Baruk (1985) . In these studies, seven-and nine-year-old children were given arithmetic problem statements such as: Hung and Jonassen (2006) .
Based on the above expectations, we carried out three experiments. The first one was a basic experiment to test the prediction of a greater number of explanation obstacles and explanation questions in the understanding condition than in the problemsolving condition. To do this, a group of beginner university students read short passages under these two task conditions with instructions to ask questions if necessary.
The questions asked were categorized according to the taxonomy presented above. The second experiment was intended to ascertain the hypothesized differences in the mental representations attempted under the two task conditions, and to substantiate the underlying question-generation mechanism. To examine the expected difference in the situation models, students were asked to read the experimental passages using a think-aloud procedure to record their inferencing activity. This provided a window to the mental representation attempted by readers in each of the two task conditions. Lastly, Experiment 3 replicated the first experiment with a sample of students taken from the same pool as those participating in Experiment 2.
Experiment 1
Two science passages were read to prepare for a comprehension test (understanding condition) or, alternatively, to solve a problem (problem-solving condition). The participants had instructions to ask the questions they considered necessary to carry out the task. Explanation questions were expected to be more frequent in the understanding condition. In particular, we expected more explanation questions on certain particular information specifically selected to be at variance with common sense beliefs.
We did not have clear predictions regarding association questions in the two conditions. However, to check for the effect of task condition on the detection of obstacles to representing entities, a term unknown to the readers was introduced in one of the versions of the experimental materials. We aimed to check whether this unknown term would constitute an objective obstacle (of the association type) independent of task condition, or, alternatively, whether the perception of the obstacle would depend on the task and the reading goal. Lastly, since predictive inferences are rarely drawn when reading scientific texts such as those used in this study (Millis & Graesser, 1994) , we expected few prediction questions in either condition.
Method

Subjects
Sixty-eight first-year Biology students at the University of Alcalá (Madrid) (around 19 years old) participated in Experiment 1. Thirty-four subjects were randomly assigned to each of the task conditions. The experimental tasks were presented as part of the activities in an introductory physics course taught by one of the authors. The students were given credits.
Materials
Two experimental passages were used: Sailing and Defrosting (see Appendix for the Sailing example). These experimental passages described physical situations that involved relatively surprising phenomena: Sailing against the wind, and thawing on "cold" surfaces. The passages were the same in both experimental conditions, except for the inclusion of a sentence requesting a calculation in the problem-solving condition.
The first two sentences introduced a certain physical setting. The third sentence, starting with "However...", presented a discrepant event, i.e., a phenomenon at variance with common sense beliefs, which might normally require an explanation. However, the information was irrelevant to solving the problem in the problem-solving condition.
An unknown term (shown in italics in the Appendix) was introduced in one version of the passages (the "difficult version"). This was done to specifically check for the effect of goals on association questions aimed at identifying this unknown entity.
Each student read one passage in the regular version and the other in the difficult version.
Three-page booklets were handed out to the participants. Each passage was included in a different page, with ample space in the page to write down questions. The order of presentation of the passages was counterbalanced, and the first page of the booklet always included the task instructions.
In the understanding condition the instructions requested the participants to read the two passages in order to understand them and to be ready to take a multiple choice test about their content in the following session. The test was announced to have similar characteristics to others already taken in the course. These were inspired by well-known physics comprehension tests such as the "Force Concept Inventory" (Hestenes, Wells, & Swackhamer, 1992) or the "Determining and Interpreting Resistive Electric Circuits
Concepts Test" (Engelhardt & Beichner, 2004) . In the problem-solving condition, the instructions requested the participants to read the two passages in order to solve the problems in the following session. All of the students had substantial experience in solving standard physics problems such as those included in the course textbook (Kane & Sterheim, 1980 .
Procedure
The students were given the booklets during a regular physics class session. Both experimental tasks were presented as part of coursework. In both conditions, students were asked to carefully read the instructions and the passages at their own pace. At the end the subjects were debriefed, informing them that there would not be a second session. The entire procedure took about 30 minutes.
Measurements
The questions asked were classified as association questions, explanation questions, and prediction questions, according to the categorization explained above. Problem-solving generally involves a search through problem space, starting from an initial state that is the product of understanding the problem statement (Newell & Simon, 1972) . Given the characteristics of the problems used in this experiment, this search involved minimal obstacles. However, to consider equal target content, only questions relating to the initial state were considered in the problem-solving condition.
Four questions related to the search through problem space, such as Can it be done using a rule of three? were discarded. This amounted to 2.1% of the total number of questions asked.
Two of the authors categorized a subset of 50 questions resulting in a Kappa coefficient of intercoder agreement of .92. Questions specifically relating to the target sentence describing the discrepant event were also counted.
Results
The reading task, i.e., understanding or problem-solving, was a between-subjects variable, while lexical difficulty based on the unknown term was a within-subjects variable. As the assumptions on normality and homogeneity of variance for the number of questions asked were not upheld, nonparametric tests were used: the Mann-Whitney U test for comparisons across task conditions, and the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signedranks test for comparisons across lexical difficulty conditions. Table 1 shows average numbers of questions asked under the experimental conditions . Firstly, the effect of task condition on association questions was examined by means of two measurements: (1) Therefore, explanation questions were counted collapsing across difficulty conditions.
As hypothesized, significantly more explanation questions per subject and per passage were asked in the understanding condition than in the problem-solving condition (U = 251.5, p < .001), with a large effect size , d = 1.16. Regarding questions on the discrepant event, significant differences were also found between the understanding condition (M UND = .59, SD UND = .56 and the problem-solving condition (M PROBSOLV = .15, SD PROBSOLV = .34; U = 303.0, p < .001).
Thirdly, there was a small number of prediction questions, and no significant differences between the average number of this kind of questions (collapsing across difficulty conditions as was done for explanation questions) in the understanding condition and the problem-solving condition (U = 557.5, p = .802).
Discussion
The results support our hypothesis regarding explanation questions. Given the same input, the importance of explanation questions is different depending on the reading goal. This result is found both for explanation questions in general and specifically for questions on the discrepant event.
Very few prediction questions were asked, as expected. Asking prediction questions on this kind of texts is found to be rather infrequent, in both the understanding and the problem-solving tasks.
The task conditions seem to affect association and explanation questions in a different way. Obstacles regarding knowledge of entities, and the questions asked on them were not significantly different between task conditions in contrast to the difference in explanation questions. Also, questions on the unknown term were not significantly different between task conditions. This suggests a status for the representation of entities that is different from the representation of explanations. The need to know about entities and their characteristics, as shown by the questions asked, did not vary significantly between task conditions. Therefore it seems to be a more stable requirement than the need to include explanations, which changed significantly between conditions.
In sum, goals corresponding to different task conditions and explanation questions were shown to be related as expected. However, evidence of differences in the mental representations attempted under the two conditions would be necessary to support the plausibility of the underlying hypothesized mechanism: do students in the understanding condition attempt to build situation models including more explanations than in the problem-solving condition? To examine this expected difference, a new group of students was asked to read the experimental passages using a think-aloud procedure to record their inferencing activity, the crucial variable immediately determining the questions asked.
Experiment 2
Think-aloud procedures have been used in many studies to reveal inferences generated while reading texts (Collins Brown & Larkin, 1980; Suh & Trabasso, 1993; Trabasso & Magliano, 1996; Van den Broek, Lorch, Linderholm, & Gustafson, 2001 ).
According to our hypothesis, explanatory inferences would be more frequent in an understanding condition than in a problem-solving condition.
Regarding association inferences, we did not have a clear hypothesis about the effect that the examined task conditions might have. Predictive inferences, as indicated above, were expected to be very few.
Method
Subjects
Thirty five second-and third-year undergraduate pre-service primary teacher students (about 21 years old) from the University of Valencia (Spain) participated in the study. These students did not have such high science standards in secondary education as the Biology students who participated in Experiment 1. However, all of them were enrolled in "Science for non-scientists", a basic general science course. The students were randomly assigned to each of the task conditions: 19 in the understanding condition and 16 in the problem-solving condition. The students were given credits.
Materials
Given that the experimental procedure did not involve written responses by the students, there was more time available for the think-aloud procedure without risking fatigue on the part of the participants. Based on this, and to obtain a sufficient number of responses, an additional passage, "Cartesian Diver", was used in this experiment. In addition there was a practice passage and a cover page with instructions depending on the condition. As in Experiment 1, the students in the understanding condition were instructed to read the three target passages to understand them and be ready to take a comprehension test about their content. The test was to be administered in the following session. In the problem-solving condition the students were instructed to read the passages to solve the problems in the following session.
As in Experiment 1, the passages were the same in both conditions, except for the inclusion of a sentence requesting a calculation in the problem-solving condition.
Procedure
The students were randomly assigned to one of the two task conditions, before being individually tested in a quiet room. The think-aloud procedure followed previous applications in similar studies (Trabasso & Magliano, 1996; Van den Broek et al., 2001 ).
After having read the printed instructions, each individual student was verbally instructed to read the passages, saying out loud the thoughts that came to mind after reading each sentence. The student started reading the practice passage and the experimenter provided orientation when needed. After reading the practice passage, the student proceeded to the three experimental passages, counterbalanced across participants. The experimenter reminded participants of the need to verbalize their thoughts whenever they kept silent for more than five seconds after reading a sentence.
All the reading and thinking aloud was digitally recorded. When all the members of the sample had finished, the participants were debriefed, informing them that there would not be a second session
Measurements
The recorded think-aloud protocols were transcribed. The inferences of central concern in this study are associations, explanations and predictions. However, subjects Therefore, bidirectional Student's t tests were used to analyze the differences in associations and predictions, while a unidirectional t test was used for explanations, as there is a clear expectation as to the direction of the difference. Table 2 shows average number of explanation, prediction and association inferences per student and per text. The participants generated significantly more explanations in the understanding condition than in the problem-solving condition (t = 1.996, p = .020). No significant differences between task conditions were found regarding associations (t = .966, p = .342) and predictions (t = 1.806, p = .082).
Regarding the other types of inferences included in the Van den Broek et al. (2001) scheme, there was a borderline significant difference (t= 1.963, p = .059) between evaluations generated in the understanding condition (M UND =4.05, SD UND =3.44) and in the problem-solving condition (M PROBSOLV =2.25, SD PROBSOLV =1.88). No other difference approached significance.
Discussion
The think-aloud procedure indicated that the participating students generated significantly more explanation inferences in the understanding condition than in the problem-solving condition, as expected. The differences in association inferences and prediction inferences between conditions did not reach statistical significance. Also, the However, this new group of university students were enrolled in different studies than those participating in Experiment 1, and possible differences in scientific knowledge may have existed between the two groups. Therefore, a replication of Experiment 1 was carried out with participants taken from the same pool of teacher causal markers, such as "because", "as a consequence of", "since", "so that", "therefore" 1 ; (2) verbs explicitly stating a causal relationship, such as "cause", "enable", "make", or "result in"; and (3) implicit causal relations, involving causal verbs, as in "the wind impinges on the sail's surface pushing the boat..." .
Results
Questions asked per subject and per passage are shown in Table 3 Subjects in this experiment asked significantly more questions than subjects in Experiment 1: a grand average of 2.00 questions per subject and per passage versus 1.12
in Experiment 1 (U = 1914.0, p = .002). When analyzed according to condition, the difference was found to be significant in the understanding condition (U = 261.0, p < .001) but not in the problem-solving condition (U = 646.0, p = .705).
Discussion
The results in Experiment 3 replicate the main finding in Experiment 1. Again, there were significantly more explanation questions asked in the understanding condition than in the problem-solving condition. However the difference between conditions is significant not only for explanation questions but also for association questions in this experiment. The experiment indicates that the understanding goal led to the identification of more explanation obstacles and association obstacles, and therefore to more questions of these types, than the problem-solving goal. But readers are especially sensitive to explanation obstacles when reading for understanding this kind of texts: the difference between conditions is much greater, in terms of effect size, for explanation questions than for association questions. Prediction questions, as expected from previous research, were too few to show potential differences due to our manipulations.
The recall measure provided support to the differences in mental representations directly examined in Experiment 2: the students in the understanding condition of this experiment included significantly more explanation statements than in the problemsolving condition. Again, a greater concern for explanations is associated with an understanding goal than with a (algorithmic) problem-solving goal.
The larger number of questions asked by students in the understanding condition in this experiment should also be considered. Several confounds may account for this difference. First, although the passages were built so that they would not involve difficult scientific content, relevant knowledge was probably different for the student samples in Experiments 1 and 3. The students in Experiment 1 were enrolled in more detailed and elaborate science courses than the participants in Experiment 3. The latter may have encountered more obstacles to understanding the passage and this, in turn,
would have led to more questions asked, of both the association type and the explanation type. However, solving the problem was easy enough not to pose special difficulties to any of the two samples. A second possible influence on the total number of questions asked in the understanding condition is related to contextual variables. The academic setting in Experiment 3 was different from that in Experiment 1 in that the understanding task may have been more precisely defined in the former. Students in Experiment 1 knew relatively well the kind of comprehension test they would be taking, since they had previous testing experience. However, this was not the case in Experiment 3, where the students would only have had a general knowledge of the kind of questions that they would be required to answer in the next session. Also, the task was more naturally integrated into the course activities in Experiment 1 than in Experiment 3. Physics students in Experiment 1 may have considered the questioning activity as a tool to suitably perform what they considered to be the academic task:
answering the understanding test or, in the alternative condition, solving the problem.
Teacher training students in Experiment 3, being more familiar with educational problems, may not have considered the questioning task as instrumental toward a central performance goal, as students in Experiment 1 did, but rather as an interesting task in itself. In other words, the students' goal orientation in Experiment 1 may have been closer to a performance condition, as compared to a mastery condition in Experiment 2 (Ames, 1992; Dweck, 1986) .
In summary, this experiment replicates the central findings of Experiment 1.
However, the results pose new question marks on various factors that influence questioning in classroom contexts, such as the effect of subject matter knowledge or of the students' goal orientation in the reading task.
General Discussion
In this study we have attempted to show that reading obstacles and the resulting questioning by students should not be considered absolute, but rather relative, according to the reading goals involved. Two specific results show the dependence of questioning on reading goals First, we found a robust significant effect of the task on explanation questions.
Students ask significantly more explanation questions in the understanding condition than in the problem-solving condition, with large effect sizes in the two experiments. A significant difference is also found for explanation questions specifically relating to the discrepant event.
Second, task condition was found to have a different influence on association questions and explanation questions posed by the students. Although the direction of the difference in association questions between the task conditions was the same in both experiments, the difference only reached statistical significance in the second questioning experiment. In contrast, there was a strong effect of task condition for explanation questions in the two experiments, as shown by the effect size. This effect could be interpreted as showing that, for the understanding and problem-solving tasks at least, representing entities seems to be a more stable requirement for the students than explaining them. This interpretation is in agreement with Graesser, Langston, & Baggett's (1993) proposal of a canonical ordering of question-asking during knowledge exploration: questions on definitional information about entities precede causal, explanation questions.
There were too few prediction questions to examine differences based on our manipulations. Although prediction is considered to be an important skill, particularly in scientific thinking (Lavoie, 1993 (Lavoie, , 1999 , students reading scientific texts in situations such as those in our experiments find very few prediction obstacles. Our tentative explanation for this finding is based on the small number of predictive inferences made on these types of texts (Millis & Graesser, 1994) . However, the lack of prediction obstacles in a situation where students were explicitly asked to consider reading difficulties, and ask about them, points to a significant problem for future research: what text, task, or context variables would enhance the asking of prediction questions?
The hypothesized differences in question asking were based on a mechanism that involved discourse representations as key elements in question generation. Our second experiment supported the assumption of different discourse representations built under the two question triggering conditions. Differences in mental representations of discourse depending on reading goal had already been demonstrated by previous research discussed above. But our study specifically substantiated the existence of differences in the explanation inferences that are generated under an understanding condition or a problem-solving condition.
In conclusion, the present study has shown that obstacles and the resulting questions, given a particular text and a particular reader, should be more appropriately regarded as variable and relative to a reader's goal. An educationally relevant consequence follows from this. Questions frequently observed in school situations are not aimed at solving important comprehension problems, but are shallow or focused on scarcely important procedural information such as "How many pages do I have to read?" (Commeyras, 1995; Good, Slavings, Harel, & Emerson, 1987; Dillon, 1988; Scardamalia & Bereiter, 1992) . This poor questioning behavior may be a natural consequence of the poor processing goals and associated mental representations attempted by students.
Example of Passage Used in the Questioning Experiments
Read carefully the description of the following phenomenon, trying to understand it.
Sailing
Sail (Afelial) boats are used since ancient times. The wind impinges on the surface of sails (afelials), which push the boat across the water. However, sail (afelial) 
